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STAND BY ME:
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT RAISES STANDING
REQUIREMENTS IN FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, INC. v.
GASTON COPPER RECYCLING CORP.
JUST AS LONG AS YOU STAND, STAND BY ME 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress created the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of
1972 ("CWA") 2 because of national outrage and disgust over the
condition of the nation's waters. 3 CWA marked a new chapter in
the quest to eliminate water pollution by including a citizen suit
provision that allows citizens to bring suit for violation of an efflu-
ent limitation and discharge permit.4 The success of a citizen suit
depends upon whether an organization or person is able to estab-
lish standing by fulfilling the requirements set forth in Article III of
the United States Constitution.5
The various interpretations of the standing requirement, how-
ever, have resulted in inconsistent holdings throughout the circuit
courts. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
for example, chose not to "stand by" its sister circuits on the re-
quirements of organizational and representational standing in a cit-
1. BEN E. KING, Stand By Me, on THE BEST OF BEN E. KING (CURB Records
1993).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1374 (1997). For a
further discussion of CWA, see infra notes 19-52 and accompanying text.
3. See A] Gore, Clean Water Act Remarks: The Clean Water Act A Snapshot of Pro-
gress in Protecting America's Waters (visited Sept. 25, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/
owow/cwa/25report.html> [hereinafter Clean Water Act Remarks] (providing CWA
was response to growing public health concern for water pollution).
4. See John Dolgetta, Notes and Comments, Friends of The Earth v. Crown
Central Petroleum: The Surrogate Enforcer Must Be Allowed to "Stand Up" For The
Clean Water Act, 15 PACE ENVrL. L. REv. 707, 710 (Summer, 1998) (explaining Con-
gress created citizens suit provision because it viewed public participation as essen-
tial to CWA's success). For a further discussion of citizens suits, see infra notes 46-
52 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (noting
party who invokes federal jurisdiction bears burden of establishing standing). For
further discussion of Article III and the doctrine of standing, see infra notes 53-77
and accompanying text.
6. For background on the judicial confusion surrounding standing, see infra
notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
(171)
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izen suit, adding to the pervasive confusion surrounding the
standing doctrine. 7
This Note considers the Fourth Circuit case of Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.8 Section II provides a
background of CWA and the requirements for establishing individ-
ual and representational standing and injury in fact, while also
describing the judicial confusion surrounding those requirements.9
Section III summarizes the facts of the case. 10 Section IV details the
rationale of the Fourth Circuit's holding and provides a critical
analysis of the circuit's contribution to the confusion surrounding
the standing requirements.11 Finally, section V discusses the impact
that Gaston Copper's holding will have on future standing
jurisprudence. 12
II. BACKGROUND
In recent years, federal circuit courts have debated the general
requirements of the standing doctrine.' 3 The standing require-
ment derives from Article III of the Constitution, which provides
that courts should hear only "cases and controversies."1 4 To estab-
7. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107, 116 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding organizations did not demonstrate injury in fact
or fairly traceable requirements needed to establish representational standing).
8. 179 F.3d 107 (4th Cir. 1999).
9. For a discussion of the standing doctrine, see infra notes 13-18, 53-100 and
accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the facts of Gaston Copper, see infra notes 101-22 and
accompanying text.
11. For narrative and critical analyses of the Gaston Copper decision, see infra
notes 105-62, 172-74 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the impact of the Gaston Copper decision on federal
jurisprudence, see infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
13. See Patrick McDermott, Note, Environmental Groups, Aesthetic Injury, and Cit-
izens Suits: Standing Takes a Stand Under PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 12 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVrL. L. 521, 542 (1992) (stating "[E]nvironmental
group standing is in a state of transition."); see also Arthur G. Carine, III, Note, The
Clean Water Act, Standing, and the Third Circuit's Failure to Clean Up the Quagmire:
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 4 VILL. ENVrL. L.J. 179, 205-06 (1993) (remarking that Third Circuit, in Pub-
lic Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc.,
913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990), failed to clarify needed requirements surrounding
standing doctrine and only added to growing "standing quagmire").
14. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (citing "Article III of the Consti-
tution limits the judicial power' of the United States to the resolution of 'cases'
and 'controversies.'"); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (noting
standing analysis focuses on party having personal stake in case or controversy);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc., 2
F.3d 493, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1992) (asserting that party's interest in case or contro-
versy determines their standing); Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey,
[Vol. XII: p. 171
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lish a case or controversy for standing, plaintiffs in all cases must
suffer an "injury in fact," the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the
defendant's action and a decision in favor of the plaintiff must be
"likely" to redress the injury.15 If the plaintiff in the citizen suit is
an organization or association, the organization has standing only if
one or more of the organization's members possesses individual
standing to bring the suit.16 Because the United States Supreme
Court has laid only the basic groundwork for the standing require-
ments, circuit courts have had to fill in the gaps, resulting in both
inconsistent holdings and forum shopping. 17 To add to this confu-
sion, CWA contains a special citizen suit provision, which has its
own idiosyncratic standing requirements.1 8
Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasizing
party must assert sufficient stake in outcome of case or controversy); see also
Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 714 (commenting that Congress mandates citizens suits
under CWA fulfill Article III standing requirements).
15. See Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1997) (asserting
three components of standing plaintiff must establish to bring suit are injury, cau-
sation and redressability).
16. See Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey v. Magnesium Elecktron,
Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 119 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that to meet requirements of repre-
sentational standing, organizations need only show their members possess "indicia
of membership" in their organizations); cf. Carine, supra note 13, at 183 (providing
other requirements exist where court considers limitation prudent to case or when
Congress requires that plaintiff be within "zone of interest" protected by specific
legislation). See generally Kristen L. Melton, Recent Developments, Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co.: The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Extends Associational Standing to a Nonmembership, Nonprofit Corporation, 72 TUL. L.
REv. 1875, 1880 (1998) (stating representational standing is area of standing doc-
trine where courts modify prohibition of claims on basis of third parties' rights).
17. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1998)
(noting standing has always been critical part of case or controversy requirement
of federal jurisdiction); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins,
954 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1992) (commenting that organizations may have stand-
ing in federal courts to bring suit based on either injury to organization in its own
right or as representative of its members who have been injured). For further
discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling on standing requirements and circuit
courts' interpretations of these requirements, see infra notes 135-67, 171-74 and
accompanying text.
18. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d
358, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1996) (asserting in citizens suits under CWA, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that "'a defendant has (1) discharged some pollutant in concentra-
tions greater than allowed by its permit; (2) into a waterway in which the plaintiffs
have an interest that is or may be adversely affected by the pollutant; and that (3)
the pollutant causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the
plaintiffs.'").
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A. Clean Water Act
By the early 1970s, Congress found its previous attempts to reg-
ulate water pollution ineffective. 19 CWA is a direct response to the
shortcomings of prior legislation that attempted to eliminate pollu-
tants from navigable waters. 20 Congress enacted CWA in 1972 to
remedy the shortcomings of prior legislation. 21 By enacting CWA,
Congress created "the primary federal law that protects the health
of our nation's waters, including lakes, rivers and coastal areas."22
Specifically, Congress intended CWA to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."23 CWA's most radical departure from prior legislation was its
shift in focus from water quality standards to effluent limitations.24
19. See Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 710 (providing that Congress created CWA in
response to growing public concern over water pollution); see also Michael I.
Krauthamer, Note and Comment, Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium
Elektron, Inc.: Undetectable Injury, A Loophole in Citizen Suit Standing, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 837, 852-53 (Fall, 1998); see also Clean Water Act Remarks, supra note 3 (compar-
ing today's figure that two-thirds of nation's waters are safe for recreational activi-
ties with 1970s' figure of only one-third).
20. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (explaining coverage of CWA extends to all waters
and waterways of United States and discharges into waterways); see also Dolgetta,
supra note 4, at 710 (stating deficiencies in water quality standards resulted from
difficulties in establishing reliable and enforceable effluent limitations);
Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 852-53 (noting legislation prior to CWA relied on
assessing water quality standards by testing water samples where effluents flowed
rather than implementing effluent limitations); Stanley A. Millan, Fifth Circuit Sym-
posium: Environmental Law: Fifth Circuit Decisions on Water, Waste, and States' Rights,
44 Loy. L. REv. 415 (1998) (discussing CWA programs designed to protect nation's
waters); Carine, supra note 13, at 180-81 (providing Congress' intent behind CWA
was to restore national waterways and to eliminate discharge of effluents from navi-
gable waters by 1985).
21. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (stating goal of CWA is to repair damage inflicted
upon Nation's waterways); see also Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey,
Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1990); Clean Water
Act: Federal Water Pollution Control Act (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http.//
www.manhattan.edu/engineer/envn/matysuk/envl41//cwa2.htm> (detailing
CWA's purpose and scope). See generally Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar
Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 564-69 (5th Cir. 1996) (remarking on amount of discre-
tion Congress gave EPA in interpreting and enforcing CWA).
22. Clean Water Act Remarks, supra note 3 (quoting Vice President Al Gore's
remarks upon 25th Anniversary of CWA).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (providing national goals and objectives of CWA include
restoring and maintaining national water quality); see also Powell Duffryn Terminals,
913 F.2d at 68 (noting one goal of CWA to eliminate effluent discharge into navi-
gable waters by 1985).
24. See Carine, supra note 13, at 180-81 (discussing alteration in pollution con-
trol from water quality standards to effluent limitations); see also Krauthamer, supra
note 19, at 853 (providing CWA now relies on effluent limitations rather than
water quality standards to control water pollution).
4
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1. Effluent Limitations
Rather than using water quality standards to measure pollu-
tion, CWA implemented effluent limitations. 25 Congress thereby
shifted the focus of environmental legislation from detection to
prevention.26 Accordingly, "the ultimate goal of the CWA is to fo-
cus attention and resources on controlling the amount of pollution
that an entity can discharge rather than attempting to control and
measure pollution when it has already entered the waterways." 27
Section 301 (a) of CWA strictly forbids the discharge of pollutants
unless authorized by a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") Permit obtained from either the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") or a state agency with a federally ap-
proved discharge program.28
25. See Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 710-11 (commenting that CWA's implemen-
tation of effluent limitations focuses attention on controlling types and concentra-
tion of effluents entity can discharge); see also Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 853
(stating Congress requires Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMRs) to observe and
regulate amounts of effluents discharged into waters); National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) Permitting Program (visited Sept. 25, 1999) <wysiwyg://
89/http://www.epa.gov/owm/npdes.htm> [hereinafter NPDES Permitting Program]
(listing common effluents discharged into waters as: human wastes, laundry and
bath waters, oil and grease, toxic chemicals, metals and pesticides).
26. See Carine, supra note 13, at 180-81 (noting prior to CWA, focus of water
pollution control centered on water quality standards); see also Dolgetta, supra note
4, at 710 (providing water quality standards resulted in tests that could not be
defended in court because of imprecise models that could not provide correct
effluent limitations).
27. Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1111 (4th Cir.
1988) (remarking that CWA forbids effluent discharge without permit obtained
from either EPA or authorized state agency); see also Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 710-
11 (explaining NPDES permit system was created to administer change in water
pollution control from water quality standards to effluent limitations).
28. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (criminalizing discharge of effluents without ob-
taining permit). This section of CWA also provides a timetable for achieving the
objectives and goals with regard to the elimination of effluent discharges. See id.
(providing specific dates such as July 1, 1977 for setting effluent limitations for
point sources and publicly owned treatment works in existence); see also Public
Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913
F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating NPDES permits are required under CWA for
person to discharge effluents into navigable waters). A NPDES permit not only
allows for the discharge of effluents into waters, but also places limitations on the
types and concentrations of the effluents. See id. (explaining person who complies
with permit parameters also complies with CWA); see also Simkins, 847 F.2d at 1111
(noting effluent discharge is forbidden unless point source received permit from
EPA or authorized state agency); Carine, supra note 13, at 181 (stating CWA for-
bids discharge of effluents without NPDES permit and additionally requires instal-
lation of equipment to monitor pollution levels); see also Major Environmental Law:
Clean Water Act (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/region5/defs/html/
cwa.htm> [hereinafter Major Environmental Law] (noting CWA bestowed authority
to EPA to set effluent standards on industry basis and to determine standards for
20011
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NPDES permits provide detailed limitations on the types and
strength of pollutants a permit holder may discharge into waters.2 9
Essentially, NPDES permits tailor the general requirements of CWA
into specific guidelines for each entity's discharge of pollutants. 30
Permits also require permit holders to regulate effluent discharges,
file test results and other data with EPA, and cooperate with state
agencies to make Discharge Monitoring Reports ("DMRs") and
other information available to the public.31
A violation of a NPDES permit, regardless of whether a state or
federal official issued the permit, is a violation of CWA which sub-
jects the permit holder to liability under Section 505 of the Act.32
CWA also compels its permit holders to install and maintain the
equipment necessary to test and monitor effluent discharges.33
effluents in surface waters); NPDES Permitting Program, supra note 25 (commenting
that Congress intended NPDES to "protect human health and the environment").
29. See Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d at 68 (noting NPDES permits state
parameters on type and concentration of effluents permit holder may discharge);
see also Carine, supra note 13, at 181 (commenting that permit stipulates permit
holder must install and maintain equipment on premises to test and monitor efflu-
ent pollution level); NPDES Permit Program: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Sept.
25, 1999) <wysiwyg://12/http://www.epa.gov/owm/faq.htm> [hereinafter Fre-
quently Asked Questions] (remarking that NPDES permit contains limitations on "...
what you can discharge, monitoring and reporting requirements, and other provi-
sions to ensure that the discharge does not hurt water quality or people's health").
30. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 29 (providing that permits cus-
tomize general requirements of CWA to individual permit holders).
31. See Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d at 68 (noting test results are reported
to EPA, which makes use of DMRs by comparing permit limits with concentration
reports that quickly indicate whether permit holder is in compliance with permit);
see also Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546,
563-64 (5th cir. 1996) (stating Congress granted EPA discretion over regulation of
effluents under NPDES program); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 711 (remarking DMRs
available to public, reports can be used as evidence to establish reporting and dis-
charge violations); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 853 (remarking Congress re-
quires DMRs to state amount of pollution in effluents upon discharge from point
source before merging with waterway).
32. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (stating language of § 505 provides that "any citizen
may commence a civil action on his own behalf.. . against any person . .. who is
alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or limitation . . . or an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limita-
tion"); see also Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1111 (4th Cir.
1988) (providing that under §402 of CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1342, EPA has authority to
administer and enforce NPDES program or to delegate this authority to state agen-
cies); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 711 (noting permit violators can be subject to both
criminal and civil liability under CWA).
33. See Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d at 64 (stipulating permit holder must
not only comply with effluent limitations, but also needs to include on premises
equipment to monitor effluent discharge); see also Carine, supra note 13, at 181
(stating DMR tests are based on effluent pollution levels established by equipment
that permit holder is required to maintain on facility).
6
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Thus, an entity or person who complies with permit parameters is
in compliance with CWA.34
2. Amendments to CWA and its Future
At the time of CWA's enactment, approximately two-thirds of
the nation's waterways were unsafe for recreational activities. 35
From the time of implementation of CWA, however, water quality
dramatically improved nationwide. 36 While CWA, as originally en-
acted, constituted a "quantum leap for environmental protection,"
its subsequent amendments increased its power even further.3 7 For
example, the 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments provided addi-
tional limitations on the discharge of effluents and allowed states to
take responsibility for the implementation of federal programs.38
34. See Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d at 68 (stating if permit holders meet
effluent limitations along with maintaining equipment to monitor and test dis-
charges, then permit holder in compliance with CWA); see generally Dolgetta, supra
note 4, at 710-11 (remarking that CWA's goal is to focus attention on effluent
limitation standards in order to reduce amount of pollution entering waterways).
35. See Clean Water Act Remarks, supra note 3 (providing that 25 years ago wet-
lands lost 460,000 acres annually, sewage treatment plants serviced only 85 million
people, and agricultural runoff resulted in toxic pollutants into waterways).
36. See id. (remarking on water quality improvements in rivers, lakes and bays
resulting from cooperative efforts by federal, state and local government programs
established by CWA); see also Water Environment WEB: Clearing the Way for Clean
Water (visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http://www.epa.org/docs/cwhistory.html> [hereinaf-
ter Water Environment WEB] (commenting on progress made in cleaning up pol-
luted water). According to EPA, since the enactment of CWA, 60% of U.S. waters
met CWA's designated-use goals in 1992, as compared with 36% in 1972. See id.
(noting in same time period, water quality in 98% of river miles and 96% of lake
acreage remained same or improved).
37. See Clean Water Act: Major Legislative Milestones in Protecting the Nation's Wa-
ters (visited Sept. 25, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/owow/cwa/timeline.html>
[hereinafter Major Legislative Milestones] (providing that although creation of CWA
in 1972 criminalized discharging effluents without permit, amendments to CWA
strengthened these limitations).
38. See id. (noting amendments to CWA not only further initial goals, but also
allow for states to contribute and participate in CWA programs); see also WaterEnvi-
ronment WEB, supra note 36 (stating Congress amended CWA in 1977 to promote
delegation of NPDES program to states and expand EPA's ability to monitor dis-
charge of toxic pollutants into collection systems and surface waters). Other
amendments and additions to CWA include the 1987 Water Quality Act and the
1990 Coastal Zone Act Reauthorizationi Amendments. See Major Legislative Mile-
stones, supra note 37 (providing 1987 Water Quality Act supported state and local
governments' new efforts to deal with pollution runoff). Additionally, the Water
Quality Act implemented a loan fund to continue the construction of treatment
plants and created programs protecting specific estuaries of national importance.
See id. (explaining that Act catalyzed action to address pollution from runoff).
Both of these amendments were legislative milestones that continue to strengthen
and execute CWA's water quality standards and goals. See Major Legislative Mile-
stones, supra note 37 (stating Coastal Zone Act focused attention on reducing pollu-
tion runoff in 29 coastal states).
2001]
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Although CWA's effect on the nation's waterways is significant,
much work remains unfinished. 39 CWA enters this next century
with a focus on three specific goals: the protection of public
health, 40 a reduction in polluted runoff4' and a restoration of un-
healthy waters.42 One enforcement provision of CWA that will help
achieve these goals is its citizen suit provision.43
39. See Water Environment WEB, supra note 36 (stating primary goals of 1972
CWA are yet to be achieved). These goals included the elimination of effluent
discharges into navigable waters by 1985, achieving a water quality level that pro-
tects aquatic organisms by July 1, 1983 and the prohibition of toxic effluents in
large amount. See id. (listing three original goals of CWA).
40. See Clean Water Act: Future Challenges (visited Sept. 25, 1999) <http://
www.epa.gov/owow/cwa/future.html> [hereinafter Future Challenges] (noting fu-
ture plans for CWA will continue to protect public health because "clean water is
essential to the health [and well being] of all Americans"). To meet this chal-
lenge, Congress' plans for CWA include working in conjunction with communities
and individuals to protect their sources of water. See id. (commenting on how
clean water program will strive to protect locations and sites where communities
receive their water supplies). While state and local authorities are primarily re-
sponsible for protecting their citizens' health, EPA will provide additional assis-
tance in developing tests to detect harmful water pollutants. See id. (discussing
EPA's role in assisting state and local authorities to develop methods to test fish
and shellfish for harmful pollutants). Furthermore, EPA will provide support to
develop protective and timely warnings about the quantities and type of fish and
shellfish that are safe for consumption. See id.
41. See Future Challenges, supra note 40 (stating that Congress hopes CWA will
reduce polluted runoff because, according to various state and local agencies, "pol-
lution runoff is... the leading cause of water pollution"). Congress intends CWA
to remedy this situation by reducing polluted runoff from urban areas and animal
feed operations, the leading contributors to the problem. See id. (explaining that
through movement across fields, streets and other areas, runoff gathers soil parti-
cles, pesticides, fertilizers, animals wastes and other pollutants).
42. See id. (describing areas and methods CWA plans to focus its attention on
for next century). Congress' future plans for CWA are to identify the specific bod-
ies of water that citizens cannot use for recreational enjoyment and develop plans
for their restoration. See id. (discussing waters singled out for restoration shall be
those unable to support basic recreational uses such as fishing and swimming). To
accomplish this task, EPA and state officials will work together to calculate water
pollution levels and develop the means to restore the individual water bodies. See
id. (explaining that to restore rivers, lakes and bays, federal, state and local govern-
ments must work together for restoration of rivers, lakes and bays).
43. See Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elek-
tron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1997) (remarking that Congress enlisted
public assistance with creation of citizen suit); see also Sam Kalen, Standing on its
Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental Cases,
13J. LAN4D USE & ENvT . L. 1, 4 (noting development of citizen suit is viewed as
victory because it results in increased citizen participation in governmental pro-
grams); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 858 (stating Congress included citizen suit
provision in CWA to allow private citizens and executive branch to bring suit
against violators).
8
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3. Citizen Suits
Congress included in CWA a provision allowing citizens to ei-
ther bring suit or report alleged violations of CWA. 44 CWA's citizen
suit provision states: "[A] ny citizen may commence a civil action on
his own behalf ... against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chap-
ter or (B) an order issued . . . with respect to such a standard or
limitation. '45 Accordingly, a citizen suit helps the government en-
force CWA. 46
Section 505(g) defines a "citizen" as "a person or persons hav-
ing an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by an alleged
violation of CWA.47 Thus, by this simple and broad definition, Con-
gress vested American citizens with tremendous and unique powers
44. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (providing that under CWA, "any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf against any person who is alleged to be
in violation of an effluent standard or... an order issued by the Administrator or a
State"); see also Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 114-15; Sierra Club, Lone Star Chap-
ter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 560 n.27 (remarking that citizens are
given authority under section 1365(f) to bring enforcement actions under CWA
for violation of effluent standards or limitations); Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 497-98 (3d Cir.
1993) (stating section 505 allows citizen to bring suit on his own accord); United
States v. The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 883 F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1989)
(noting plain language of section 1365 allows citizens to intervene in civil action);
Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 712-13 (noting CWA "empowers citizens to bring suits
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). The section states in whole:
[A] ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any
person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the 11th Amend-
ment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation.
Id. Cf Carine, supra note 13, at 182 (noting citizens suit provision of CWA resulted
from compromise between House of Representatives and Senate). The House bill
proposed restricting standing to only citizens within a certain geographical range
of the alleged violation, whereas the Senate bill allowed any person to bring suit.
See id.
46. See Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 114 (recognizing importance of citi-
zens' interest in implementing CWA); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 712 (recognizing
Congress looked to citizens for additional assistance in implementation and en-
forcement of CWA). See generally Sharon Elliot, Citizens Suits Under the CWA: Wait-
ingfor Godot in the Fifth Circuit, 62 TUL. L. REv. 175 (1987) (depicting role citizens
play in CWA).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a) (1); see also Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1985); Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990);
Carine, supra note 13, at 182 (noting definition of "person" under CWA includes
corporations and associations). Environmental groups also qualify under the citi-
zens definition for CWA. See id. (explaining environmental groups are persons).
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to enforce CWA or to prevent and remedy violations of CWA. 48
The bestowal of these powers did not come easily and are still the
source of great debate and compromise among the members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. 49
The legislative history of CWA demonstrates that Congress in-
tended the citizen suit provision to provide additional support in
the implementation and execution of CWA's goals.50 The Senate
report illustrates that an "essential element in any control program
involving the nation's waters is public participation." 51 The legisla-
tive history demonstrates not only the importance of the citizen suit
provision, but also that Congress felt courts should not capriciously
constrain citizens' ability to bring suits under CWA.52
B. Article III and the Doctrine of Standing
Although Congress granted citizens the power to bring suit
under CWA, Article III of the United States Constitution still re-
48. See Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 713 (noting Congress limited grant of power
to enforce violations under CWA to citizens with interests which may be adversely
affected by violation); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 849 (remarking citizen suit
provision of CWA applies to members with adversely affected interests resulting
from pollution violations).
49. See Carine, supra note 13, at 182 (contrasting House of Representatives
proposal, which promoted restriction of citizens suits to only those affected indi-
viduals or groups, with Senate proposal, which allowed anyone to bring suit);
Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 713 (noting debate and disagreement between House of
Representatives and Senate regarding citizens suits).
50. See S. REP. No. 92-414, 2, 10 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3676 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 92414] (noting Congress looked to citizens directly
impacted by discharge of effluents for assistance in enforcement of CWA); see also
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d at 560 (providing legislative history of CWA stating
Congress delayed availability of citizens suits to give EPA and states additional time
to issue permits required by CWA); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 712 (noting Congres-
sional intent with regards to citizen suit provision); McDermott, supra note 13, at
532 (remarking on Congress' intent in designing citizen suit provision of CWA).
51. S. REP. No. 92414, supra note 50, at 7-11; see also Public Interest Research
Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 114 (3d Cir.
1997) (stating Congress enlisted citizens to participate in CWA by allowing them to
bring suits against those who violate CWA); Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d at 74
(discussing Congress' scheme of supplementing government action with citizen
suits); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 712 (discussing Congress' intentions for enacting
CWA).
52. See S. REP. No. 92-414, supra note 50, at 76; see also Dolgetta, supra note 4,
at 712 (emphasizing importance of citizen suits and stressing citizens should be
unconstrained to bring these suits). It is also mentioned in the legislative history
that courts should not hesitate to hear and try citizens suits. See id. (explaining
role Congress wanted courts to play). With the establishment of CWA and the
citizen suit provision, "Congress has expressed its enthusiastic support for the
cleansing of our nation's waterways." Kalen, supra note 43, at 4 (stating litigants
began to view courts as possible arbiters to environmental disputes in 1960s); see
also McDermott, supra note 13, at 532.
[Vol. XII: p. 171
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quires citizens to establish standing as a prerequisite. 53 The stand-
ing doctrine derives from the Article III requirement that courts
may only hear "cases and controversies"; a plaintiff that fails to
demonstrate standing does not present the court with a "case or
controversy," and the court must consequently dismiss the suit.
54
While the element of standing is critical in any lawsuit, that require-
ment is paramount in most environmental law cases.5
5
A standing analysis centers on whether a party has sufficient
interest in the controversy.56 In order to demonstrate a sufficient
53. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1998)
(stating action becomes moot if standing elements are not present at all times
throughout suit); Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1997) (re-
marking that case will be dismissed if plaintiff lacks standing); see also Powell Duf-
fryn, 913 F.2d at 70-71; Melton, supra note 16, at 1878 (noting fundamental
question in determining standing is whether party bringing suit possesses personal
stake in outcome of case or controversy).
54. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 stating:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of ad-
miralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different
States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-
eign States, Citizens or Subjects.
See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (commenting
that Article III limits jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies,"
but injury by executive branch can possess title of case); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984) (noting core component of subject matter jurisdiction is element
of standing); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982) (remarking it is not clear
whether particular features of standing requirement are compelled by Article III
or by Supreme Court); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (defining stand-
ing as mix of constitutional requirements and jurisprudential considerations); Si-
erra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); Kalen, supra note 43, at 2
(providing standing is part of judicial jurisdiction law that determines whether
courts hear arguments and cases).
55. See Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 714 (asserting establishment of standing as
key to success in most environmental cases). The judicial system plays an integral
role in determining if a particular plaintiff possesses standing. See id. (reporting
on requirements and tests resulting from number of cases heard by Supreme
Court regarding both individual and representational standing); see also
Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 854 (providing that establishing standing in environ-
mental law cases is difficult because no person has greater claim over environment
than another); McDermott, supra note 13, at 536-37 (acknowledging that demon-
strating standing is difficult barrier for most environmental plaintiffs to over-
come). But see Millan, supra note 20 at 424 (describing that outcome of Friends of
the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co., 129 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 1997) relaxed member-
ship requirements for establishment of standing).
56. See Public Interest Research Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elek-
tron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1997) (remarking that Third Circuit in
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interest, associations and organizations must establish both individ-
ual standing and representational standing.57 To establish standing
in federal courts, an organization must demonstrate three require-
ments: (1) its members would have individual standing to sue on
their own rights; (2) the interests the organization seeks to protect
are related to the organization's purpose; and (3) the claim does
not include the participation of individual members in the law-
suit.5 8 This Note focuses upon individual standing, the first re-
quirement of this test. In order to satisfy individual standing, an
organization must show three additional requirements: (1) its
members personally suffered an actual or threatened injury in fact
as a result of the illegal conduct of the defendant; (2) the injury is
"fairly traceable" to the contested action; and (3) a favorable deci-
sion is likely to compensate or redress the injury. 59
Magnesium ruled that if plaintiff could not meet injury-in-fact requirement he
lacked standing); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 566 (commenting that Supreme Court
rejected argument that statute's purpose, protection of ecosystems, granted plain-
tiffs standing to protect animals on other side of world); Sierra Club v. Simkins
Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting citizen suit provision
of CWA does not automatically establish Article III standing); Krauthamer, supra
note 19, at 854 (asserting general grievances of public at large do not provide
parties with standing); Melton, supra note 16, at 1878 (providing that relation be-
tween status of plaintiff and claim presented is essential to guarantee plaintiff is
proper and appropriate party to bring suit).
57. See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 569 (1992) (holding environmental groups lacked
standing to bring suit challenging regulation by Secretary of Interior dealing with
Endangered Species Act and funding for projects that harm animals); Magnesium
Elektron, 123 F.3d at 119 (providing organizations must not only establish represen-
tational standing, but individual standing as well); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v.
Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc. 73 F.3d 546, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1996); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1992); Powell Duffryn,
913 F.2d at 70; see also Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 714-15 (commenting that Congress
created distinct role for private enforcement under CWA's citizens suits and na-
tional environmental groups have seized every opportunity to bring suit).
58. See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 70 (commenting if organization's members
did not have individual standing then organization lacks standing); see also Magne-
sium, 123 F.3d at 119 (providing that standing comprises of both jurisprudential
and constitutional requirements); see also Crown Centra, 95 F.3d at 360; CedarPoint,
73 F.3d at 555; Watkins, 954 F.2d at 978 (discussing that organization did not claim
injury in its own capacity, but rather for its members, thus it needed to fulfill repre-
sentational and individual standing tests); Kalen, supra note 43, at 9-10 (discussing
that Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740-41 (1972), estab-
lished three requirements that guided standing in environmental cases for next 25
years); Melton, supra note 16, at 1881-84 (commenting that representational stand-
ing by organizations in environmental law cases offers advantages to members rep-
resented and to judicial system because members might lack resources or
experience needed to bring suit).
59. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1982) (stating Article III limits federal
judicial reach and power to only those disputes that confine federal courts to roles
consistent with separation of powers doctrine and that are traditionally viewed as
12
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1. Injury in Fact
The first prong of the individual standing requirement,
whether the plaintiff has suffered an actual or threatened injury, is
commonly known as "injury in fact."60 Injury in fact requires that a
plaintiff suffer "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' 61 The Supreme Court first articu-
lated this requirement for standing in Association of Data Processing
Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp,62 and then later defined and ex-
capable of resolution through judicial system); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (re-
marking that Supreme Court precedent has established that the irreducible consti-
tutional minimum required in standing constitutes three elements: injury in fact,
fairly traceable connection to defendant's action and that injury is likely to be
redressed with favorable court decision); Carine, supra note 13, at 183 (comment-
ing additional requirements for standing also exist where court contemplates juris-
prudential limitations or where Congress mandates plaintiff be within zone of
interest protected by specific legislation).
60. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (articulating Supreme
Court's theory behind representational standing). The Supreme Court stated:
Even in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing
solely as the representative of its members .... The association must
allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or
threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that
would make [our] ajusticiable case had the members themselves brought
suit .... So long as this can be established, and so long as the nature of
the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participa-
tion of each injured party indispensable to the proper resolution of the
cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its mem-
bers, entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 511; see also Magnesium, 123 F.3d at 119-20 (providing that neither Congress
nor CWA authorize private causes of action against polluters absent some showing
of injury or threatened injury); Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 555-56 (noting unimpor-
tance of injury couched in terms of future injury rather than past injury). See gener-
ally Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578 (explaining injury required by Article III may exist solely
by virtue of statutes that create legal rights); Carine, supra note 13, at 182-84 (not-
ing prior legal interest test inappropriately investigated merits of case).
61. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 473 (noting injury in fact re-
quirement is designed to limit access of courts to those with sufficient stake in
outcome); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289,
307 (1979) (discussing that inquiry is whether injury presents real, substantial con-
troversy between parties that possess adverse legal interests and dispute is definite
and concrete rather than hypothetical or abstract); Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 556-57
(commenting size of injury is not important and identifiable small injury will suf-
fice); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 716 (explaining that particularized means injury
must affect plaintiff in personal and individual way); Kalen, supra note 43, at 14
(adding injury in fact requires more than mere injury to cognizable interest)
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972)). See e.g., Powell Dufflyn,
913 F.2d at 71 (providing pollution is considered injury that interferes with enjoy-
ment of natural resources).
62. 397 U.S. 150, 152-54 (1970) (explaining that Court's decision to abandon
old legal interest test represented not simply incremental development, but rather
divergence in axioms of legal thinking); see also Kalen, supra note 43, at 5 (provid-
ing that Data Processing broadened class of individuals entitled to seek judicial re-
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panded the injury in fact element in Sierra Club v. Morton.63 In Si-
erra Club, the Court broadened the scope of the injury in fact
requirement to include aesthetic injuries. 64 The Court articulated
that the degree of injury was unimportant, so long as "some identifi-
able injury" resulted from the defendant's actions. 65
2. Fairly Traceable
The second individual standing element requires that the
cause of the plaintiffs injury be fairly traceable to the defendant's
illegal conduct.66 The plaintiff need not show to a scientific cer-
view under Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") to include party with injury in
fact that is within zone of interest protected by statute or constitutional provision
at issue).
63. 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (stating while sincere interest in situation was
insufficient for Article III standing, aesthetic injury could amount to injury in fact);
see also Carine, supra note 13, at 185 (emphasizing that in Sierra Club, Supreme
Court stated that standing would not be denied on basis that many individuals
could allege similar injury); Kalen, supra note 43, at 5 (discussing that broadening
class of plaintiffs increased citizens access to courts); McDermott, supra note 13, at
527 (remarking that courts willingness to hear aesthetic injury cases opens door to
more citizens).
64. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35 (articulating injury to aesthetic, environ-
mental or recreational interests is enough to establish standing provided party
seeking review has sustained injury); see also Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 557 (observing
low threshold for injury requirement of standing that Sierra Club created in its
holding); Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir.
1988) (noting aesthetic and non-economic injury satisfies injury in fact require-
ment of standing); Carine, supra note 13, at 188 (commenting that Sierra Club rul-
ing fashioned more liberal environmental standing doctrine); Kalen, supra note
43, at 14 (stating aesthetic, environmental and economic well-being are key ele-
ments of quality of life in contemporary society) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)). See generally Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985) (providing organization whose members
claim interest but no injury are not adversely affected and do not have standing);
Millan, supra note 20 (noting citizens do not have to show injury from effluents
approaching limitation levels to prevail in personal injury suits).
65. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35 (affirming Supreme Court's endorse-
ment of requirement that party bringing suit be among injured); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (asserting "some day" intentions
without more definite plans or more specifics do not support finding of actual or
imminent injury standing cases require); Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997
F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (confirming even small probability of injury is suffi-
cient to create case or controversy); Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 71 (commenting
that plaintiffs' interests are more than trifles and therefore injuries need not be
large to satisfy injury in fact requirement of standing); McDermott, supra note 13,
at 527 (remarking that Court in Sierra Club denied standing to plaintiffs because no
individual member stated use of contested area in any way that would be negatively
impacted by proposed actions of defendants).
66. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (noting while exercise of judicial
power is ultimate and supreme function of court, it is also formidable means of
vindicating individual rights when employed unnecessarily, therefore party evok-
ing federal jurisdiction must meet requirements); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
14
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tainty that the defendant's actions caused the precise harm suffered
by the plaintiff.67 Rather, the plaintiff must only establish that
there exists a "substantial likelihood" that the defendant's conduct
caused the plaintiffs harm.68
In environmental law cases dealing with CWA, such as Gaston
Copper, a substantial likelihood is demonstrated by showing that: (1)
a defendant discharged an effluent in concentrations greater than
allowed by its permit; (2) the plaintiff possessed an interest in the
waterway that is or may be adversely affected by the effluent; and
(3) this effluent caused or contributed to the plaintiffs alleged in-
juries.69 Although a plaintiff must only demonstrate a substantial
likelihood, a plaintiff must nonetheless show more than a "mere
exceedance of a permit limit" to meet these criteria.70
490, 508 (1975) (providing focus of standing is whether party has sufficient stake
in outcome to obtain judicial resolution of dispute); Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72
(asserting in this case court expanded fairly traceable requirement in citizens suits
to further enforce CWA);Jim Irvin, Recent Developments in Case Law, Fourth Cir-
cuit Finds That to Establish Standing Environmental Injury Plaintiffs Need Only Show
"Fairly Traceable" Causation By Establishing the Defendant's Pollutant "Causes or Contrib-
utes to the Kinds of Injuries Alleged", 2 S.C. ENvrL. L. J. 95, 96 (Winter, 1992) (stating
plaintiffs must demonstrate they personally suffered injury fairly traceable to illegal
conduct of defendants to establish standing).
67. See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72 (noting fairly traceable requirement does
not require plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant's actions and defendant's ac-
tions alone caused plaintiffs injuries); see also Public Interest Research Group of
NewJersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1997)
(explaining that fairly traceable requirement enables plaintiff to link environmen-
tal injury to defendant when plaintiff is unable to demonstrate defendant's actions
caused injuries); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Refining and
Marketing, Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 505 (3d Cir. 1993); Carine, supra note 13, at 187 (as-
serting question of whether environmental group's injuries were fairly traceable to
defendants' action is more difficult requirement to satisfy); Irvin, supra note 66, at
96 (explaining that to establish individual standing plaintiffs must show they per-
sonally suffered injury fairly traceable to defendant's conduct).
68. See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72; see also Texaco Refining, 2 F.3d at 505;
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that to establish standing for environmental injury, plaintiffs need not
demonstrate that particular defendant caused their injury, rather absent defen-
dant's activities plaintiff would enjoy unaffected use of their resource). See generally
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum, 95 F.3d 358, 361-62 (5th
Cir. 1996) (stating, at some point, court can no longer assume that injury is fairly
traceable to defendant's conduct solely on basis of observation).
69. See Powell Dufflyn, 913 F.2d at 72; see also Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at
121-22 (commenting that substantial likelihood test does not replace test for stand-
ing under Article III of Constitution); see also Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.
Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating Third Circuit in Powell Dufflyn cre-
ated three-part test to establish injury is fairly traceable to defendant's discharge in
CWA citizen suit); cf. Texaco Refining, 2 F.3d at 505 (explaining that if testimony
links defendant's actions to injuries asserted by plaintiff then nothing more is
needed to establish standing).
70. See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72 (noting under CWA, if plaintiff alleges
injury, but fails to show defendant's effluent contains pollutants that harm ecosys-
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3. Redressability
The final prong needed to establish individual standing re-
quires that the injury be redressable by a favorable judicial deci-
sion. 71 This requirement is closely related to the fairly traceable
factor.72 The salient difference between the two elements is that
the fairly traceable component centers on the connection between
the plaintiff s injury and the defendant's action, whereas the redres-
sability requirement focuses on the nexus between the plaintiff's
injury and the judicial relief sought.73 The probability of redres-
sability with a favorable court decision must be "likely" as opposed
to merely "speculative." 74 The redressability requirement of stand-
tem, plaintiff lacks standing); see also Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 121 (asserting
legal right to have corporations obey environmental laws cannot by itself establish
standing); Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 557 (noting overly broad application of test may
be problematic); Carine, supra note 13, at 188-89 (stating historically environmen-
tal group plaintiffs had not encountered much difficulty fulfilling standing re-
quirements; however, there now appears movement toward more rigorous
standing requirements).
71. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)
(articulating that federal court acts only to redress injury that fairly can be traced
to contested action of defendant, and not injury that results from independent
action of some third party); see also Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (com-
menting that Article III limits federal power of courts to rule consistent with system
of separation of powers); Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 556 (noting the elements needed
to establish individual standing); Carine, supra note 13, at 183 (providing along
with these three criteria for individual standing, other requirements such as pru-
dential limitations and zone of interests protected also exist).
72. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 758-59 (concluding redres-
sability requirement assures actual factual setting where plaintiff asserts claim of
injury); see also Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 73 (explaining that under CWA if plain-
tiff complains of harm to water because defendant exceeded its permit limits in-
junction will redress that particular injury in part); Kalen, supra note 43, at 24
(stating fairly traceable and redressability represent one causation requirement).
73. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759 n.24 (articulating three core consti-
tutional standing requirements). If a difference exists between the two require-
ments, "it is that [fairly traceable] examines the casual connection between the
assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas [redressability] exam-
ines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief re-
quested." Id. at 753 n.19; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)
(asserting plaintiff must assert individual legal rights and not rest upon relief of
third parties).
74. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 1926 (explaining redressability is not mere pleading
requirement, but rather element indispensable to plaintiffs case); see also Valley
Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472 (remarking that redressability requirement
serves several purposes embodied in Article III). See generally Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (commenting that party invoking federal jurisdiction
bears burden of establishing elements of standing).
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ing tends to assure that legal questions will be resolved in a con-
crete forum of a courtroom rather than a debating society.75
C. Judicial Confusion Surrounding Standing
The Supreme Court has fashioned separate tests for individual
and representational standing in federal court.76 In Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc.,77 the Supreme Court articulated the "irreducible minimum"
test for standing.78 While this test represents the threshold require-
ments that all plaintiffs must meet to establish standing, the addi-
tional standing requirements for environmental groups seeking to
bring suit on behalf of their members were enunciated in Sierra
Club v. Morton.79 Although the Court has created these tests, it has
yet to provide much guidance as to what, specifically, will satisfy
75. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472-73 (explaining that if fed-
eral courts were forums for ventilation of public grievances then concept of stand-
ing would not be necessary); see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42 (providing purpose of
standing doctrine is to filter actual cases and controversies from general
grievances).
76. See Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 70 (noting that to meet requirements of
representational standing, organizations need only show their members possess
"indicia of membership" in their organizations); see also Marshall v. Meadows, 105
F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1997) (asserting three components of standing that plain-
tiff must establish to bring suit are injury, causation and redressability); Friends of
the Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1996)
(providing that standing comprises of both jurisprudential and constitutional re-
quirements); Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 555 (5th Cir.
1996) (discussing that organization did not claim injury in its own capacity, but
rather for its members, thus it needed to fulfill representational and individual
standing tests); Melton, supra note 16, at 1881-84 (noting organization must estab-
lish both representational and individual standing in order to bring suit on behalf
of members).
77. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
78. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 471-73 (stating Supreme Court
has always required that plaintiff have standing to bring action before court); see
also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (remarking that Supreme Court precedent established
irreducible constitutional minimum required in standing that constitutes three el-
ements: injury in fact, fairly traceable nexus to defendant's action and that injury is
likely to be redressed with favorable court decision); Carine, supra note 13, at 183
(remarking that additional requirements for standing exist when courts contem-
plate jurisprudential limitations or where Congress requires plaintiff be within
zone of interest protected by legislation).
79. See 405 U.S. 727, 733-38 (1972) (articulating type of injury to support
standing could be aesthetic and non-economic type of injury); see also Public Inter-
est Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d
64, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting holding in Sierra Club allows for harm to aesthetic
and recreational interest to satisfy injury in fact requirement of standing); Carine,
supra note 13, at 184-85 (noting Supreme Court in Sierra Club further defined and
enlarged injury in fact requirement of standing); Kalen, supra note 43, at 9-10 (ex-
plaining Sierra Club decision launched modern law of environmental standing).
2001]
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each separate element of standing.80 In fact, even the Supreme
Court has been unable to define the elements to its satisfaction. 81
Examples of cases that illustrate the Supreme Court's vacillation
over the precise contours of the standing requirement include: As-
sociation of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,82 Sierra
Club v. Morton,83 United States v. Student Challenging Regulatory Proce-
dures ("SCRAP"), 8 4 Warth v. Seldin8 5 and Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group.86
In Data Processing, the Supreme Court articulated the "injury-in-
fact" requirement to determine whether the plaintiff has shown ac-
tual or personal injury.87 The Supreme Court broadened its injury-
in-fact requirement in Sierra Club by allowing an aesthetic injury to
qualify as an injury-in-fact.8 8 The Supreme Court revisited the in-
jury-in-fact requirement again in SCRAP, where it stated that the
magnitude of the injury was irrelevant so long as some identifiable
80. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472-75 (providing judicial
power affects lives, liberty and property of those to whom it extends); see also Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560-61 (stating standing elements must be supported in same way as
any other matter plaintiff bears burden of proof); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers
National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (explaining basic inquiry in standing
analysis is whether conflicting issues between parties present real, substantial con-
troversy); Kalen, supra note 43, at 3 (commenting that Supreme Court's decisions
have led to considerable confusion and disagreement among lower federal
courts).
81. See McDermott, supra note 13, at 522 (commenting on continued state of
transition that standing requirements have been in since late 1960s).
82. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (establishing injury requirement for Article III
standing).
83. 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (providing expanded notion of standing by allowing
injury to be aesthetic or environmental harm).
84. 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (remarking that injury to environment was very gen-
eral and still qualified for standing).
85. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (noting Supreme Court articulated that plaintiff must
allege specific, concrete facts for injury requirement of standing).
86. 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (asserting more flexible standard for environmental
groups that allege injury with highly attenuated causation).
87. See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152 (noting that Supreme Court replaced
the legal interest test with the injury-in-fact requirement due to criticism that it
inappropriately investigated merits of case to determine standing); Carine, supra
note 13, at 183 (remarking that injury-in-fact was first part of three-part standing
test).
88. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35 (explaining that while aesthetic and envi-
ronmental harm can qualify for injury-in-fact, plaintiff must be among injured); see
also Kalen, supra note 43, at 9-10 (noting that principles established in Sierra Club
guided environmental cases for preceeding 25 years); McDermott, supra note 13,
at 527 (remarking that Sierra Club was landmark case which formulated specific
requirements for environmental organizations bringing suits on behalf of their
members).
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injury existed.89 Then in Warth, the Supreme Court created a strict
causation requirement for standing which stated plaintiffs must al-
lege specific harms and not simply generalized grievances shared by
all citizens. 90 Finally, the Court in Duke Power, reduced the Warth
test and allowed a more flexible causation requirement for environ-
mental groups that asserted an injury with a highly attenuated
causal chain.91
The sum of these cases is a dearth of guidance for circuit
courts struggling to reconcile the Supreme Court's cases. 92 Due to
this lack of guidance, the circuit courts have taken it upon them-
selves to define the elements of standing, resulting in inconsistent
holdings.93  While all the circuits agree on the requirements
needed to establish standing, they clearly disagree over the defini-
tion and application of those requirements.9 4 For example, in Pub-
89. See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89 (stating that "standing is not to be denied
simply because many people suffer the same injury . . . ."); see also Carine, supra
note 13, at 185-86 (noting plaintiffs had standing in this case even though causa-
tion chain was more attenuated than that of Sierra Club's plaintiffs); McDermott,
supra note 13, at 527-28 (commenting that even Supreme Court admitted that in-
jury to environment was very general and could have been alleged by any citizen
who frequented area).
90. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 502 (commenting that when harm alleged by plain-
tiff is one shared by many people, that harm alone does not confer standing with-
out more particularized facts); see also McDermott, supra note 13, at 525 (asserting
that more than generalized grievance must be alleged to confer standing); Melton,
supra note 16, at 1881 (indicating that representational standing does not elimi-
nate requirement that members must assert individual injuries).
91. SeeDuke Power, 438 U.S. at 67 (noting Supreme Court found that there was
substantial likelihood that injuries were fairly traceable to defendant's plant opera-
tions); see also Carine, supra note 13, at 187-88 (remarking that standing require-
ment for environmental plaintiffs in 1970s was easily met through careful
pleading).
92. See Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 714-15 (quoting Roger Beers, noted scholar
who remarked in course study presented by American Law Institute, "there has
been little consistency and considerable confusion in pastjudicial opinions regard-
ing the elements of standing . . . ."); see also McDermott, supra note 13, at 522
(emphasizing that depending on how Supreme Court interprets standing require-
ments, courts may require specific injury or will allow generalized grievance); Mel-
ton, supra note 16, at 1890-91 (discussing, how Fifth Circuit's extension of
associational standing in Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co. improperly in-
terpreted past Supreme Court's rulings regarding associational standing).
93. See Kalen, supra note 43, at 2 (explaining Supreme Court needs to recon-
sider prudential and constitutional aspects of standing); see also Krauthamer, supra
note 19, at 859 (remarking that unless Congress clearly states what constitutes in-
jury in fact under CWA's citizens suit provision, then courts will construe what is
needed for requirements at their discretion). Cf Crown Central, 95 F.3d at 361
(noting while test in Powell Duffryn is helpful for analyzing injury in fact and fairly
traceable, it may not be useful in other. CWA cases).
94. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 1998) (articu-
lating three elements needed to establish standing are: (1) actual or threatened
injury in fact; (2) plaintiffs injury must be caused by defendant's conduct; and (3)
2001]
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lic Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn,95 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit ruled that scientific certainty was not necessary
for a plaintiff to prove causation; rather a plaintiff must only
demonstrate that there exists a "substantial likelihood" that the de-
fendant's action caused the alleged harm.96 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co.,9 7 elaborated
on the Powell Duffryn test by holding an environmental group satis-
fies the fairly traceable requirement simply by demonstrating that
the defendant's pollution contributes to the plaintiffs harm.98
Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Sierra
Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc.,99 allowed a mere exceedance of an
effluent limit to qualify for injury-in-fact. 10 0 These liberal rulings
have led to forum shopping and inequity, making judicial clarifica-
tion of the standing doctrine important. 10 1
injury must be redressable by relief requested); see also Public Interest Research Group
of New Jersey v. Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d 111, 119 (3d Cir. 1997) (remarking
standing requirements were formulated from Supreme Court decisions and crite-
ria); Friends of the Earth v. Crown Central Petroleum, 95 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 1996)
(establishing that all circuit courts adhere to standing requirements provided by
Supreme Court decisions).
95. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990).
96. See id. at 71-73 (reiterating that while plaintiffs injuries must be fairly
traceable to defendant's conduct, this does not mean plaintiff must show to scien-
tific certainty that defendant and defendant alone caused plaintiffs harm); see also
Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 121-22 (noting that while substantial likelihood test
does not replace standing test under Article III, its purpose is to allow plaintiffs to
link environmental harms to defendants' actions when plaintiffs cannot establish
scientific certainty of causation); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 719-20 (providing that
while plaintiff need not prove causation with scientific certainty, more than mere
exceedance of permit was needed for fairly traceable requirement).
97. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996).
98. See id. at 558 (ruling that "it is sufficient for Sierra Club to show that Cedar
Point's discharge of produced water contributes to the pollution that impairs
[plaintiff s] use of the bay"); see also Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 723-24 (commenting
on Fifth Circuit's interpretation of what qualifies for Supreme Court's injury-in-fact
requirement); Millan, supra note 20 (stating that plaintiff bringing citizen suit
need not prove individual harm, only that illegal effluent discharge contributed to
pollution that impaired plaintiff's use of waterway).
99. 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988).
100. See id. at 1113 (stating "actual injury stemming from reporting and sam-
pling violations, coupled with the threatened injury stemming from the failure to
report ... levels of harmful effluents, establishes injury . . ").
101. See Melton, supra note 16, at 1891 (providing when Supreme Court con-
tinuously qualifies holding to situation of particular case, lower courts should not
extend holding without good cause); see also Carine, supra note 13, at 199-200
(stating it remains unclear under CWA if standing elements require specificity);
Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 730 (commenting that Fifth Circuit in Crown Central, 95
F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 1996), chose not to apply Powell Duffiyn test to determine
whether element of fairly traceable was satisfied).
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III. FACTS
Gaston Copper Recycling Corporation ("Gaston Copper") op-
erates a non-ferrous metals smelting plant on Lake Watson in Gas-
ton, South Carolina.' 0 2 The facility was covered by a NPDES permit
granted by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environ-
mental Control ("DHEC").103 This permit authorized Gaston Cop-
per to discharge treated contaminated storm water into Lake
Watson. 104
Friends of the Earth ("FOE") and Citizens Local Environmen-
tal Action Network, Inc. ("CLEAN") brought a citizen suit against
Gaston Copper under CWA on behalf of their members. 10 5 Their
complaint alleged Gaston Copper violated its NPDES permit.10 6
Specifically, plaintiffs claimed Gaston Copper continuously violated
the permit by failing to: (1) obey the discharge limitations for cer-
tain pollutants; (2) comply with specific pollutant requirements;
and (3) adhere to a schedule that would limit the discharge of
harmful pollutants. 10 7
To bolster the allegations made by FOE and CLEAN, three of
the organizations' members testified that they "each had a legally
protected interest in the waterways that were harmed by Gaston
Copper's . . .violations."'108 Wilson Shealy claimed a protected in-
102. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107, 109 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that plant's location is on Lake Watson, which is
wholly contained).
103. See id. (explaining when Gaston Copper purchased facility in 1990, facil-
ity was covered by National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
Permit). The DHEC reissued Gaston Copper's Permit on February 13, 1991, with
a renewal date of March 1, 1991. See id.
104. See id. (stating Gaston Copper's Permit required: treatment of contami-
nated storm water prior to discharge into Lake Watson, discharge of limited quan-
tities of effluents, schedule for compliance with effluent limitations, and reporting
and monitoring of effluent discharges).
105. See id. For a further discussion of citizens suits, see supra notes 44-52 and
accompanying text.
106. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 109-10 (stating FOE and CLEAN in their
citizens suits allege Gaston Copper violated and continued to violate its March 1,
1991 Permit). FOE and CLEAN claimed Gaston Copper's violations "affected
their 'ability to protect and improve the waters of South Carolina' and affected the
'health, economic, recreational, aesthetic and environmental interests' of their
members." Id. at 110. FOE and CLEAN also claimed that Gaston Copper's viola-
tions interfered with their members' "ability to take action on their own behalf."
Id.
107. See id. (noting FOE and CLEAN sought civil penalties, declaratory and
injunctive relief, and court fees in their citizens suits due to Gaston Copper's Per-
mit violations).
108. Id. (noting not all three members belonged to both organizations). Wil-
son Otto Shealy is a member of CLEAN, William McCullough, Jr. is a member of
FOE and Guy Jones belongs to both FOE and CLEAN. See id.
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terest in the lake on his property, which was located four miles
downstream from Gaston Copper's facility.109 GuyJones claimed a
protected interest deriving from the Edisto River because he made
his living by giving guided tours on the river.110 Finally, William
McCullough, Jr. claimed he possessed a protected interest because
he used the Edisto River to scuba dive.' 11 All the members claimed
that their "protected recreational and economic interests in the wa-
terways that they used were injured in fact by Gaston Copper's ...
violations."' 12
To prove Gaston Copper violated its permit and injured the
protected interests of the organizations and their members, FOE
and CLEAN introduced expert testimony and two environmental
studies during trial. 113 Dr. Bruce Bell stated that Gaston Copper's
permit, although not specifying toxicity limits, did provide water
quality limits and required Gaston Copper to monitor its toxicity
limits by conducting total effluent toxicity tests.114 According to Dr.
Bell, the tests conducted by Gaston Copper for DHEC, which evalu-
ated the concentration of certain pollutants in fish tissue from Lake
109. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 110 (mentioning Shealy's family engaged
in recreational activities on their 67 acre lake, such as fishing and swimming). Wil-
son Shealy believed his lake contained mercury after reading a local newspaper
article that stated all area lakes contained mercury, and DHEC testing on his lake
prior to suit revealed the presence of effluents. See id. at 110-11. Shealy claims Bull
Swamp and several other waterways, Boggy Branch included, are the source of his
lake. See id. at 110 n.2. For a further discussion of Shealy's claim, see supra note
107 and infra note 112.
110. See id. at 110 (reporting GuyJones is owner and president of canoe com-
pany which provides guided tours on Edisto River). For a further discussion of
Jones' claim, see supra note 107 and infra note 112.
111. See id. For a further discussion of McCullough's claim, see supra note
107 and infra note 112.
112. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 110 (explaining various community con-
cerns for polluted lakes). For example, Shealy states his property value has dimin-
ished because of Gaston Copper's discharges and public remarks that his lake is
"polluted". See id. at 111. Jones stated his concern about the impact of Gaston
Copper's discharges arises out of the inability of his company to provide quality
tours where his clients' health would not be threatened. See id. Finally, McCul-
lough expressed his concern about "all waters in South Carolina that [he] dives
having contaminants, especially heavy metals, [and] pesticide runoff." Id.
113. See id. at 111 (noting FOE and CLEAN relied upon expert testimony of
Dr. Bruce Bell and two studies conducted by Gaston Copper to illustrate their
members' protected interests were injured in fact).
114. See id. (noting Dr. Bell's testimony revealed that Gaston Copper's 1991-
1995 toxicity tests for DHEC indicated discharged effluents had "observable effect"
on nearby waters). The Fourth Circuit determined that while Dr. Bell testified
about the negative impact these toxicity tests disclosed, he "was unable to relate
the toxicity tests to the alleged ... [P]ermit water quality effluent limit violations."
Id.
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Watson, revealed three important findings.11 5 First, concentrations
of heavy metals existed in the tissue of the fish inhabiting the
lake. 116 Second, the discharges from Gaston Copper created no
"apparent degradation" of the fish. 117 Finally, although the tests
demonstrated that lead and copper were at detectable concentra-
tions in the sediment, the tests also mentioned that "these concen-
tration [levels] were less than previous years, and 'similar to values
seen throughout South Carolina."' 118
The United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 1 9 Ac-
cording to the district court, "FOE and CLEAN failed to establish
standing in their own right or representational standing to bring
their claim representing the interests of their members." 120 The
district court also noted that the two organizations did not properly
demonstrate that the alleged injuries suffered by their members
were fairly traceable to Gaston Copper's permit violations. 21 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit, despite a vocal dissent by Chief Justice
Wilkinson, affirmed the district court's holding.1 22 Specifically, the
Fourth Circuit held that the organizations established neither in-
115. See id. (discussing Gaston Copper's two studies for DHEC that FOE and
CLEAN relied upon in suit). These two studies, the "1993 and 1994 Water Quality
Stud[ies] to Evaluate the Fish Tissue, the Macroinvertebrate Community and Sedi-
ments at Gaston Copper Recycling Corporation," analyzed Lake Watson, Boggy
Branch and Bull Swamp Creek. Id.
116. See id. (discussing how studies indicated specific heavy metal concentra-
tions in fish tissue from Lake Watson, but no fish tissue studies were conducted in
Boggy Branch or Bull Swamp Creek).
117. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 111. (concluding both studies showed no
indication of fish decline in numbers or health due to Gaston Copper's discharges
in Lake Watson).
118. Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 112 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston
Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d 107 (J.A. 944,960,972,990)) (stating studies showed
small levels of copper, lead and mercury in Lake Watson, but only revealed lead
and copper in sediment of Boggy Branch and Bull Swamp Creek). The studies
also concluded that "these concentrations were less than previous years, and 'simi-
lar to values seen throughout South Carolina."' Id.
119. See id. (asserting district court concluded FOE and CLEAN failed to es-
tablish either individual or representational standing and, therefore, district court
had no subject matter jurisdiction to hear case).
120. Id. (remarking that FOE and CLEAN's members neglected to present
evidence that Gaston Copper's discharges injured or threatened their members'
waterways). The Court noted that Shealy, Jones and McCullough's testimony
alone were not sufficient evidence of "adversely affected" waterways. Id.
121. See id. (commenting on district court's determination that injuries to
FOE and CLEAN's members were not fairly traceable to Gaston Copper's
discharges).
122. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 116 (noting Fourth Circuit agreed with
district court that FOE and CLEAN lacked standing to bring citizens suit).
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jury in fact on behalf of their members nor that the injuries were
fairly traceable to Gaston Copper's conduct. 123
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
1. The Standing Requirement
The Fourth Circuit appropriately began its analysis by review-
ing whether the plaintiffs had established standing.1 24 The Gaston
Copper court noted that organizations such as FOE and CLEAN may
have standing to bring suit in federal courts either individually or as
a representative of its members.1 25 The organizations brought citi-
zen suits on behalf of their members, as a result the Fourth Circuit
first considered whether the organizations' members would have
had individual standing to bring suit on their own behalf.126 For an
individual to have standing, the individual must demonstrate: (1)
an actual or threatened injury resulted from illegal conduct; (2)
that the injury must be "fairly traceable" to the illegal conduct; and
(3) that the injury is likely to be remedied by a favorable judicial
decision. 127 Consequently, the Gaston Copper court considered
whether these three requirements had been satisfied, and deter-
mined the organizations fell short on the first two prongs.' 28
123. See id. (stating organizations failed to establish Gaston Copper's Permit
violation contributed to supposed pollution which injured members' protected in-
terest waterways).
124. See id. at 113 (beginning its analysis of case by reviewing whether FOE
and CLEAN established necessary standing to bring citizens suit under CWA).
125. See id. at 112 (citing Natural Resources Defense Council v. Watkins, 954
F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1992)).
126. See id. at 113 (discussing that to establish representational standing, orga-
nizations first must establish "their members would have an individual right to
sue").
127. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 113 (setting forth individual standing re-
quirements set forth by Supreme Court in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, (1982)). The Fourth
Circuit quoted the Supreme Court's opinion in Valley Forge
[A] t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the
court's authority to 'show [1] that he personally has suffered some actual
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the
defendant, and [2] that the injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged
action' and [3] 'is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.'
Id. (quoting Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472).
128. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 113 (determining whether FOE and
CLEAN established injury in fact requirement).
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a. Establishing Injury in Fact
The Gaston Capper court observed that to prove an injury in
fact, plaintiffs must demonstrate an infringement of a legally pro-
tected interest, that is "(a) concrete and particularized and (b) ac-
tual or imminent, not . . . hypothetical."1 29 While the Fourth
Circuit recognized the members' waterway interests were legally
protected, it found a lack of sufficient evidence to prove that Gas-
ton Copper's conduct posed an actual or potential threat to the
waterways. 130
In Gaston Copper, the Fourth Circuit found no evidence to con-
firm the existence of pollutants in Shealy's lake or the sections of
the Edisto River used by Jones and McCullough.131 In fact, the Gas-
ton Copper court observed that no type of toxicity test had been con-
ducted on these waters.13 2 In addition, none of the members'
testimonies revealed any apparent or noticeable negative impact on
the waters or the surrounding areas.133 Although the members tes-
tified they were "concerned that Gaston Copper's conduct has re-
sulted in pollution of water in which Shealy and McCullough
recreated and of water in which Jones' company used," the Gaston
Copper court concluded neither waterway sustained actual or con-
crete injury13 4
As a result, the Fourth Circuit decided the FOE and CLEAN
organizations based their claims on "mere speculation... without
any evidence to support their fears or establish the presence of pol-
129. Id. Although the Supreme Court has stated some invasions of economic
interests may constitute injury in fact, the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged certain
invasions of environmental and aesthetic interests may also comprise injury in fact.
See id.; see, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974,
980 (4th Cir. 1992) (providing that organization's members had standing if pollu-
tion discharge affected area where members engaged in recreational activities);
Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding Fourth Circuit acknowledges aesthetic and environmental harm as satisfy-
ing injury-in-fact requirement of standing).
130. See Gaston copper, 179 F.3d at 113-14 (commenting that plaintiffs' affida-
vits indicated observations of waterways conditions yet did not show pollution re-
sulted from defendant).
131. See id.
132. See id. at 114 (remarking no toxicity test or studies were performed on
FOE and CLEAN members' protected interest waterways).
133. See id. at 113-14 (finding "none of the members even testified there was
an observable negative impact on the waters that they used or surrounding ecosys-
tem of such waterways").
134. Id. at 114 (noting Shealy, Jones and McCullough's testimonies stated
they possessed concerns regarding Gaston Copper's discharges, but could not pro-
vide actual or specific evidence of harm to their waterways as result of discharges).
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lutants in the allegedly affected waters. 1 35 The Fourth Circuit
stated that, aside from mere "concerns" of injury to the waterways,
no persuasive evidence indicated any negative effect on the waters
due to pollutants. 136
b. Traceability of Gaston Copper's Conduct.
Finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish an actual injury or
threat of injury to the protected waters of FOE and CLEAN's mem-
bers, the Fourth Circuit asked, in the alternative, whether the orga-
nizations had provided sufficient evidence that the alleged injuries
were fairly traceable to Gaston Copper's conduct. 137 FOE and
CLEAN contended their members' injuries were "fairly traceable"
to Gaston Copper's violations of its permit because the harmful dis-
charges occurred upstream from the waterways where their mem-
bers had protected interests.' 38 The organizations presented evi-
dence that demonstrated how the runoff of water from Lake Wat-
son flows to Boggy Branch, Bull Swamp Creek and then to the
Edisto River.13 9 FOE and CLEAN contended this evidence conclu-
sively proved the pollutants Gaston Copper discharged in Lake Wat-
son threatened their members' protected interests in their respec-
tive waterways. 140
The Gaston Copper court noted, however, that to fulfill the fairly
traceable requirement of standing, a plaintiff must illustrate the ex-
istence of a "substantial likelihood" that the harm caused was the
result of the defendant's conduct. 14' The Fourth Circuit held that
135. Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 114 (remarking that FOE and CLEAN did not
present tests or studies to indicate negative impact caused to their members' pro-
tected interest waterways as result of Gaston Copper's conduct).
136. See id. at 114 (providing testimonies of "mere speculation" about nega-
tive impact on waterways was not enough evidence to establish standing for Fourth
Circuit to conclude Gaston Copper's discharges polluted waterways).
137. See id. at 115. For a discussion of the fairly traceable requirement for
establishing standing, see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
138. See id. (noting FOE and CLEAN's theory was based upon notion that
water flows downstream). Gaston Copper's Facility is located upstream from the
protected interest waterways of FOE and CLEAN's members. See id. (remarking
that Shealy's lake sits only four miles from Gaston Copper's facility).
139. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 112 (stating FOE and CLEAN presented
evidence that DHEC hearing officer testified "runoff flows from Lake Watson to
Boggy Branch, to Bull Swamp Creek, and to the Edisto River").
140. See id. at 112 (discussing how FOE and CLEAN based their claims on
DHEC officer's testimony and argued Gaston Copper's discharge flows down-
stream thus injuring their members' protected interest waterways).
141. See id. at 115 (stating Fourth Circuit held FOE and CLEAN neglected to
establish second requirement of substantial likelihood analysis which requires wa-
terway where plaintiff has protected interest to be negatively affected by pollutant
discharged by defendant).
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/5
GASTON COPPER RECYCLING
FOE and CLEAN presented no evidence to illustrate the waterways
possessed the type of pollutants discharged by Gaston Copper.
142
Because "FOE and CLEAN did not present evidence that the alleg-
edly affected waterways . . . contained effluents of the type Gaston
Copper discharges", they failed to satisfy the substantial likelihood
requirement.14 3
Furthermore, the Gaston Copper court stated neither Gaston
Copper's toxicity tests nor its studies were conducted on Shealy's
lake or the protected interest portions of the Edisto River. 144 The
Fourth Circuit acknowledged the undeniable fact that water flows
downstream; it concluded, however, "the distances between the
source of the alleged pollution and the protected waterways . . .
[are] simply too great to infer causation."1 45 The Gaston Copper
court concluded that, although no absolute mileage limit precludes
a plaintiffs satisfaction of the fairly traceable requirement of stand-
ing, the mere assertion that water flows downstream does not satisfy
the requirement. 14
6
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent in Gaston Copper, authored by the Fourth Circuit's
Chief Justice Wilkinson, charged that the majority's interpretation
of the standing requirement made it impossible to bring a citizen
suit under CWA. 14 7 Although the dissent disagreed with the major-
ity's result, the dissent found fault only with the dismissal of
CLEAN's suit on behalf of Wilson Shealy. 14 8 According to Chief
142. See id. at 115 (noting FOE and CLEAN neglected to present evidence
that their members' waterways possessed effluents found in Gaston Copper's dis-
charges into Lake Watson).
143. Id.
144. See Gaston Capper, 179 F.3d at 115 (revealing "[n]either Gaston Copper's
laboratory toxicity tests, nor its 1993 and 1994 studies, was performed on Shealy's
lake or portions of the Edisto River" used by Jones and McCullough).
145. Id. (acknowledging that portions of Edisto River used by Jones and Mc-
Cullough are 10 to 15 miles from Gaston Copper's facility). Although Shealy's
lake is only four miles from Gaston Copper's facility, 31 ponds intervene and three
other streams deposit into his lake. See id.
146. See id. at 115 n.7 (explaining there is no mileage requirement for fairly
traceable element of standing). The Fourth Circuit stated "FOE and CLEAN's reli-
ance on the proposition that water flows downstream is, however, simply insuffi-
cient to establish the fairly traceable element of standing." Id.
147. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 116-17 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (accus-
ing majority of raising standing requirements to level that would essentially elimi-
nate citizens suits under CWA). Chief Justice Wilkinson states "[t] oday's holding
set courts up for the litigation of scientific facts as a matter of standing - facts
unnecessary to the ultimate questions presented in these cases." Id. at 117-18.
148. See id. at 117-18 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that dissent
agreed with dismissal of suits brought on behalf of other two members). The dis-
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Justine Wilkinson's dissent, the majority's ruling diverged from
other circuits' decisions in three important ways: (1) it required ad-
ditional scientific proof although a clear nexus exists between "the
claimant and the area of environmental impairment"; (2) it failed
to acknowledge the harm caused by the threatened injury; and (3)
it required tort-like causation to prove the traceability of harm.149
Chief Justice Wilkinson consequently lamented the majority's un-
necessary divorce from the majority of other circuits. 150
B. Critical Analysis
The Fourth Circuit, in Gaston Copper, unnecessarily adds to the
judicial confusion surrounding the elements of standing.151 First,
the majority seems to have usurped Congress' authority by raising
the requirement levels for both the injury in fact and fairly tracea-
ble elements of standing. 152 Second, the Fourth Circuit fails to
stand by its sister circuits' rulings by suggesting that a threatened
harm will not be recognized unless a plaintiff presents conclusive
proof that harm exists.1 53 Thus, unlike its sister circuits, the major-
sent states, in a footnote, that the lack of evidence presented places Jones' and
McCullough's waterways within Gaston Copper's discharge zone. See id. at 117 n.1.
149. See id. at 121-22 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting). Essentially, the dissent
points out that "no court has seen fit to restrict citizens such as Wilson Shealy from
vindicating their legal rights under the Clean Water Act, and many [courts] rou-
tinely consider similar claims." Id. at 122.
150. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 117-23 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (pro-
viding majority in Gaston Copper departs from other circuits by requiring scientific
certainty of standing requirements). In his dissent, Chief Justice Wilkinson states
the majority's divorce from other circuits' holding creates a "super standing re-
quirement [that] renders Shealy's legal rights - and hence Gaston Copper's legal
obligations - null in all but a word." Id. at 117.
151. See id. at 116 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (requiring plaintiffs in environ-
mental suits to not only demonstrate elements of injury in fact and fairly traceable
but to prove them with scientific evidence). For discussion of what is required by
the Supreme Court to establish standing and the confusion about the require-
ments see supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
152. See id. at 116-17 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that by "erect-
ing standing hurdles so high as to effectively excise the citizen suit provision from
the Clean Water Act", Gaston Copper's majority intrudes upon Congressional pow-
ers). For a discussion of Gaston Copper's majority encroaching on Congress' author-
ity with the raising of the standing requirements, see infra notes 137-46 and
accompanying text.
153. See id. at 122 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (stating "the majority's virtual
silence on the issue of threatened injury is at odds with the wide recognition that
threats or increased risk constitute cognizable harm"). For a discussion of
threatened harm satisfying the injury in fact element of standing, see infra notes
160-65 and accompanying text.
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ity in Gaston Copper appears to now require tort-like causation to
satisfy the fairly traceable element of standing.154
Chief Justice Wilkinson's dissent in Gaston Copper, not Judge
Hamilton's majority, better accords with the majority of circuits. 155
Chief Justice Wilkinson correctly contends that the majority over-
looks the basic reality that Gaston Copper's discharges did violate
its permit.156 The dissent also accurately emphasized that scientific
facts are not necessary to prove either the injury in fact or the fairly
traceable requirements of standing.1 57
1. The Majority Decision
The standing doctrine is premised on the Article III concept of
separation of powers. 158 Although Article III of the Constitution
grants the judicial branch the right to enforce laws created by the
legislative branch, it does not grant courts the power to make laws
more onerous and burdensome.1 59 The Fourth Circuit's ruling in
Gaston Copper, however, has taken the injury in fact and fairly trace-
154. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 122 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting
that no other court requires additional tort-like causation to establish traceability).
For a discussion on causation needed to establish fairly traceable requirement of
standing, see infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
155. See id. at 117-22 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing that Gaston
Copper court's additional requirement of scientific proof to establish injury-in-fact
and traceability departs from other circuits holdings). For a discussion of Chief
Justice Wilkinson's dissent and how it better accords with the majority of the cir-
cuit courts, see infra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
156. See id. at 118 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting dissent, "[1]ost in the
majority's rendition of the record is a simple reality: Gaston Copper has been ac-
cused of violating its discharge permit .. "). For a discussion of how the majority
in Gaston Copper overlooked the NPDES permit violation, see infra notes 173-78 and
accompanying text.
157. See id. at 117 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "[n]othing in Arti-
cle III suggests that our jurisdiction hinges on such elevated standards of [scien-
tific] proof"). For a discussion on the injury in fact and fairly traceable
requirements and the alleged need of proof with scientific evidence, see infra
notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
158. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (commenting that Article III requires federal courts to
hear all "cases" and "controversies"); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984) (providing key factor of subject matter jurisdiction is standing); Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982) (noting uncertainty whether particular features
of standing requirement are mandated by Article III or by Supreme Court);
Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 854 (asserting standing is part of determination of
whether courts hear particular case); Melton, supra note 16, at 1878 (explaining
relation between asserted claim and plaintiff is to guarantee appropriate party is
bringing suit).
159. See Melton, supra note 16, at 1877 (stating case and controversy require-
ment of Article III limits federal courts from intruding into areas allocated to other
branches of federal government); see also McDermott, supra note 13, at 530-31
2001]
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able requirements to an improperly heightened level that would
preclude plaintiffs with meritorious claims from obtaining legal
redress. 160
Despite the Gaston Copper majority's recognition of these tests,
it incorrectly applied them and thereby wrongly dismissed CLEAN's
suit on behalf of Wilson Shealy.161 Instead of allowing a threatened
injury to qualify as injury in fact, as articulated in the "irreducible
minimum" test, the majority required some tangible evidence of in-
jury before it would acknowledge the injury. 162 Additionally, the
majority incorrectly held that even if Shealy possessed an injury in
fact, CLEAN did not provide sufficient evidence that the alleged
injuries were fairly traceable to Gaston Copper's conduct. 163 These
heightened requirement levels undermine Congress' intent of
CWA's citizen suit provision. 164 Thus, by requiring CLEAN to
demonstrate more than the circumstantial evidence presented, the
Gaston Copper majority encroached upon Congress' power by raising
the standing requirements and thus offended notions of separation
of powers. 165
(providing courts can not intervene in actions that are designated for other
branches of government).
160. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107, 117 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (explaining by requiring tan-
gible evidence for injury in fact and fairly traceable, majority in Gaston Copper ig-
nores separation of powers principles).
161. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 113-15 (noting although Fourth Circuit
recognizes that invasions of aesthetic and environmental interests may satisfy injury
in fact, FOE and CLEAN's members claims of economic and recreational interest
did not establish injury in fact).
162. See id. at 113-14 (emphasizing that since no tests, studies or other forms
of evidence were presented to demonstrate injury to FOE and CLEAN's members'
waterways, they failed to establish injury in fact).
163. See id. at 115 (finding that since FOE and CLEAN failed to present evi-
dence that linked members' waterways with type of effluents Gaston Copper's facil-
ity discharged they did not satisfy fairly traceable requirement).
164. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1) (A) (noting statute allows any citizen to bring
suit against any person who is "alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard or
limitation"); see also Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 732 (commenting Congress has spe-
cifically provided citizens role in enforcing environmental laws with citizen suit
provision); Kalen, supra note 45, at 4 (noting since creation of citizen suit provi-
sion litigants now view courts as arbiters to environmental conflicts); McDermott,
supra note 13, at 532 (explaining by Congress' enactment of CWA's citizen suit, it
has expressed enthusiastic support for cleansing of nation's waters).
165. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (articulating that judicial power
as defined by Article III is not unconditional authority to determine constitutional-
ity of legislative or executive acts); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559-60 (1992) (providing Constitution's central mechanism of separation of
powers depends mainly upon understanding of what actions are designated to leg-
islature, executive and judicial branches); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 859 (not-
ing unless Congress specifically states its intent as to what constitutes an injury,
[Vol. XII: p. 171
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a. The Injury in Fact Requirement
Since the Supreme Court's announcement of the irreducible
minimum requirements necessary to satisfy standing in Valley Forge
Christian College, the circuit courts have adopted various interpreta-
tions of these requirements. 166 The Supreme Court, in Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife,1 67 held that a threatened injury would qualify as
injury in fact so long as it was "actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical."' 68 Although other circuits, such as the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Village of Elk Grove Village v. Ev-
ans,1 69 the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co. 1 70 and
even the Fourth Circuit in Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus.,1 7 1 a case that
pre-dates Gaston Copper, have acknowledged the difficulty in proving
courts will use their discretion to construe definition of injury); McDermott, supra
note 13, at 530-31 (stating court will not intervene in administration of laws unless
Congress allows them).
166. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 472 (stating party who invokes
court's authority to hear and decide case must demonstrate at irreducible mini-
mum that: (1) party personally suffered actual or threatened injury as result of
illegal conduct of defendant; (2) plaintiffs injury is fairly traceable to defendant's
conduct; and (3) favorable decision by court will redress injury); see generally,
Carine, supra note 13, at 196 (noting Third Circuit acknowledged that harm to
aesthetic and recreational interest were sufficient to provide standing); Dolgetta,
supra note 4, at 727-28 (commenting that Fifth Circuit denied standing to environ-
mental group plaintiff because it did not demonstrate with scientific evidence that
defendant's discharge negatively affected plaintiffs waters); Irvin, supra note 66, at
96-97 (observing Fourth Circuit's ruling that for plaintiff to establish fairly tracea-
ble he/she needed to show defendant's pollutant was responsible for kinds of inju-
ries alleged by plaintiff); see also Kalen, supra note 43, at 3 (explaining that as result
of Supreme Court's decisions, there is confusion and disagreement among lower
courts on how to apply rules of standing); McDermott, supra note 13, at 542 (pro-
viding that environmental group standing is in state of transition and there are
several possibilities for increased access to judicial review).
167. 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that environmental group seeking to chal-
lenge regulation pursuant to Endangered Species Act lacked standing).
168. Id. at 560 (discussing established irreducible minimums of constitutional
standing). The actual and imminent requirements exist to guarantee that "courts
do not entertain suits based on speculative or hypothetical harms." Public Interest
Research Group of NewJersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 122
(3d Cir. 1997) (adding although evidence of generalized harm might support
standing, it fails to support claims of threatened injury once defendant demon-
strates to court those injuries are unlikely).
169. 997 F.2d 328 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that appeal to enjoin Army Corps
of Engineers from granting permit for construction of radio tower in flood plain
near municipality without complying with executive order regarding flood plain
development was rendered moot by abandonment of radio tower project).
170. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming finding of standing for environ-
mental group based on affidavits of members alleging injuries to aesthetic
interests).
171. 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that failure to file reports which
were required by discharge permit could be subject of citizen suit).
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a threatened injury, they have also recognized that threats and in-
creased risks qualify as injury in fact.172
The majority in Gaston Copper wrongly rejected CLEAN and
Shealy's evidence of past pollution on the grounds that the DHEC
toxicity tests were conducted before Gaston Copper purchased its
facility.' 73 Other circuits would find the evidence that pollution
from this facility reached Shealy's lake in the past is sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate that the plaintiffs fears and concerns are
based on more than mere speculation.' 74 The Fourth Circuit ma-
jority, however, would wrongly require CLEAN to submit scientific
proof that effluents found in Shealy's lake resulted in fact from the
Gaston Copper plant before the Fourth Circuit would recognize
threatened harm. 175 This newly required threshold is in direct op-
position to standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Babbitt v.
United Farm Workers National Union,'76 which does not require plain-
172. See Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil, 73 F.3d 546, 557 (5th Cir. 1996) (pro-
viding that injury to aesthetic, environmental or recreational interests is sufficient
to establish standing and these injuries need not be substantial); see also Village of
Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that
"even a small probability of injury is sufficient" to confer standing to plaintiff);
Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that
threat of future injury from failure to report effluent permit violation qualifies as
injury in fact for standing); Carine, supra note 13, at 185 (stating Supreme Court
declared that magnitude of alleged injury is not important for standing purposes
as long as some identifiable injury was present); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 845
(providing if courts ignore injury requirement, then they would abandon critical
fact of case and controversy clause that distinguishes judiciary from legislative and
executive branches).
173. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107, 114 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining majority rejected 1990 DHEC tests that
Shealy and CLEAN presented because they were dated before Gaston Copper pur-
chased facility and past evidence of pollutants is not sufficient for imminent threat
of harm requirement); see also Millan, supra note 20, at 419 (remarking that it is
not relevant for standing requirement purposes whether injury is past or future
impairment).
174. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 120 (noting CLEAN's suit was filed in 1992,
shortly after Gaston Copper had purchased facility, and from 1990 through 1993
Gaston Copper operated its facility using same treatment system that its prior
owner had used); see also Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 124 (3d Cir. 1997) (remarking that efflu-
ent discharges pose real threats to environment, thus qualifying them as
threatened injury for standing purposes); Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing pollution in protected interest waterway is sufficient to establish standing).
175. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 115-16 (explaining Gaston Copper court re-
quires plaintiff to present sufficient tangible evidence and facts illustrating actual
or imminent injury that is fairly traceable to defendant's conduct in order to have
standing).
176. 442 U.S. 289 (1979) (reversing district court finding that Arizona farm
labor statute was unconstitutional).
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tiffs to wait until harm occurs before seeking judicial relief.177
Therefore, by demonstrating that Gaston Copper is violating its ef-
fluent permit by polluting nearby water, CLEAN and Shealy estab-
lished a threatened injury that should satisfy the injury in fact
requirement.178
b. Causation and the Fairly Traceable Requirement
The majority in Gaston Copper was also misguided in its inter-
pretation of the fairly traceable requirement. 179 As the Third Cir-
cuit stated in Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals
Inc., °80 "the requirement that plaintiffs' injuries be fairly traceable
to the defendant's conduct does not mean that plaintiffs must show
to a scientific certainty that defendant's effluent, and defendant's
effluent alone, caused the precise harm suffered by the plain-
tiffs.' 8'1 The Fourth Circuit, in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
177. Compare Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (asserting plaintiff does not have to wait
for harm to occur before seeking judicial relief), with Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (commenting that past exposure to illegal conduct
does not show present case or controversy); see also Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil
Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 556-57 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating injury can be for future harm
rather than past harm); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 728-29 (noting plaintiff can sim-
ply assert that harm may take place and that future impairment is sufficient to
establish injury); Kalen, supra note 43, at 51-52 (remarking that Lujan requires
plaintiff to demonstrate increased risk of environmental harm affects plaintiffs
concrete and particularized interest); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 850 (provid-
ing where actual injury is absent, imminence is required).
178. See Gaston Coprper, 179 F.3d at 120 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (explain-
ing that Gaston Copper's permit violations create concrete threats to waters with
range of its discharge, which Shealy's lake falls within); see also Magnesium Elektron,
123 F.3d at 124 (commenting that it is possible for plaintiff in future to allege
injury from defendant's failure to monitor and report effluent discharges); Sierra
Club v. Simkins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109,1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating under
application of Fourth Circuit's past precedent, individual has standing to pursue
monitoring and reporting claims regardless of whether toxins have yet reached
waterway); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 849 (observing CWA citizen suit provi-
sion requires only that person be adversely affected by illegal pollution).
179. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 115 (mentioning CLEAN did not satisfy
substantial likelihood part of fairly traceable because it did not present tests or
studies that demonstrated effluents discharged by Gaston Copper were present in
Shealy's lake).
180. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff need not prove causa-
tion with absolute scientific rigor to defeat motion for summary judgment).
181. Id. at 72; see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Texaco Re-
fining and Marketing, Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 505 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that
while plaintiffs need not establish causation to scientific certainty, they must show
substantial likelihood that defendant's conduct caused their harm); Magnesium
Elektron, 123 F.3d at 121-22 (explaining substantial likelihood test of fairly traceable
allows plaintiff to link environmental injury to defendant's pollution when plaintiff
is unable to prove to scientific certainty that defendant's discharges caused plain-
tiffs injury); Marshall v. Meadows, 105 F.3d 904, 906 (4th Cir. 1997) (observing
plaintiff is only required to prove that injury can be fairly traced to contested ac-
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v. Watkins,182 also agreed with its sister circuits that "[t]he fairly
traceable requirement.. . is not equivalent to a requirement of tort
causation. '183 Rather, the Watkins court noted that plaintiffs need
only show that "a defendant discharges a pollutant that 'causes or
contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the plaintiffs."''1 8 4
The majority in Gaston Copper, however, improperly held that
Shealy's injury was not fairly traceable to Gaston Copper's discharge
because CLEAN did not submit any scientific proof that the efflu-
ents from Gaston Copper's facility were present in Shealy's lake. 185
By requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate causation of harm with scien-
tific proof, the majority in Gaston Copper failed to stand by its sister
circuits' rulings that have not restricted citizens such as Shealy from
bringing suit under CWA.186
tion to establish causation); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 728 (noting that "[e]xisting
case law consistently stresses that the plaintiffs do not have to establish to a scien-
tific certainty that the defendant's discharge is adversely affecting the waterway in
question").
182. 954 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1992).
183. Id. at 980 n.7 (quoting Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72). For the establish-
ment of standing to redress an environmental injury, a plaintiff does not need to
prove that a specific defendant is the only cause of their injury. See id. at 980
(adding that plaintiff must simply demonstrate that defendant's effluent dis-
charges causes or contributes to types of injuries claimed by plaintiff); see also Pow-
ell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72 (stating plaintiff need not establish causation with
absolute scientific certainty to defeat motion for summary judgment); Carine,
supra note 13, at 197 (observing that strict tort causation is not needed for fairly
traceable requirement).
184. Watkins, 954 F.2d at 980 (quoting Powell Duflyn, 913 F.2d at 72). To
establish standing for environmental injury, plaintiffs need not demonstrate that a
particular defendant caused their injury; rather, absent defendant's activities,
plaintiff would enjoy unaffected use of their resource. See id. (agreeing with Third
Circuit's holdings regarding standing requirements); see also Texaco Refining, 2 F.3d
at 505 (explaining that Third Circuit expounded fairly traceable requirement for
CWA's citizens suits); Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72 (stating that citizen suit's fairly
traceable requirement was furthered by Third Circuit). See generally Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 95 F.3d 358, 361-62 (5th Cir. 1996)
(stating that, at some point, court can no longer assume that injury is fairly tracea-
ble to defendant's conduct solely on basis of observation).
185. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179 F.3d
107, 115 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating neither toxicity tests nor studies were performed
on Shealy's lake and that CLEAN neglected to present any evidence that Gaston
Copper's discharges adversely affected Shealy's protected interest in his lake); see
also Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 121-22 (explaining fairly traceable requirement
enables plaintiff to link environmental injury to defendant when plaintiff unable
to demonstrate defendant's actions caused injuries); Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72
(noting fairly traceable requirement does not require plaintiff to demonstrate that
defendant's actions and defendant's actions alone caused plaintiffs injuries); Mil-
lan, supra note 20, at 421 (observing that citizens "do not have to prove injury from
pollutants approaching levels necessary to prevail in personal injury cases").
186. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 115-16 (stating CLEAN did not establish
Wilson Shealy suffered injury in fact or that alleged injury was fairly traceable to
Gaston Copper's discharge violations); cf. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73
34
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol12/iss1/5
GASTON COPPER RECYCLING
2. Judge Wilkinson's Dissent
Chief Justice Wilkinson, writing the lone dissent in Gaston Cop-
per, more accurately portrayed the sentiment of the majority of cir-
cuit courts.' 8 7 The dissent correctly noted that Gaston Copper's
majority opinion completely overlooked the basic fact that Gaston
Copper violated its NPDES permit by exceeding its effluent dis-
charge limitation.1 88 Wilkinson stressed the important fact that Wil-
son Shealy lives a mere four miles downstream from Gaston
Copper's facility, and concluded that evidence of Gaston Copper's
polluting nearby waters makes Shealy's fears and concerns of
threatened injury both reasonable and substantiated.18 9 The Su-
F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding citizens' concern about water was sufficient
for standing); see also United States v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District, 883
F.2d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1989) (approving standing of citizens' group who claimed
recreational and aesthetic injuries); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 768 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985) (granting standing to two members who
allege recreational and aesthetic injuries); Carine, supra note 13, at 188 (providing
that environmental group plaintiffs have not encountered much difficulty in satis-
fying standing requirements); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 728 (acknowledging that
existing case law emphasizes that plaintiffs need not establish to scientific certainty
that defendant's discharges adversely affect plaintiff's waterways); Irvin, supra note
66, at 96-97 (observing that in environmental injury cases, majority of courts have
held plaintiffs only need to fulfill fairly traceable requirement by demonstrating
that defendant's effluent discharge causes or contributes to types of injuries
claimed by plaintiffs).
187. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 117 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (com-
menting that Gaston Copper's majority departs from other circuits by refusing to
consider claim of citizen living within known discharge range of polluting facility);
see also Carine, supra note 13, at 184 (providing that affidavits stating environmen-
tal group members used area for recreational enjoyment is sufficient to meet in-
jury in fact requirement); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 719 (noting Supreme Court
declared harm to recreational and aesthetic interests is sufficient for establishing
standing); Kalen, supra note 43, at 48 (observing that D.C. Circuit held showing of
environmental harm to identifiable area coupled with geographical nexus to ac-
tual use of affected area was sufficient for standing); see generally Krauthamer, supra
note 19, at 858 (remarking that under current judicial interpretation, CWA's citi-
zen suit provision is only applicable where legally cognizable injury occurs); Mc-
Dermott, supra note 13, at 530-31 (stating courts will not intervene in
administration of laws in some circumstances unless Congress directs them).
188. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 118 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (stating
that majority ignores facts in record and by doing so averts its gaze from Shealy's
downstream interest).
189. See id. (explaining Gaston Copper's discharge affects or has potential to
affect waterways for 16.5 miles downstream and Shealy sits only four miles away
from mouth of discharge pipe); see also Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 121-22 (ex-
plaining substantial likelihood requirement enables plaintiff to link environmental
injury to defendant when plaintiff is unable to demonstrate defendant's actions
caused injuries); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Watkins, 954 F.2d 974,
980 (4th Cir. 1992) (explaining that to establish standing for environmental injury,
plaintiffs need not demonstrate that particular defendant caused their injury, but
rather absent defendant's activities plaintiff would enjoy unaffected use of their
resource); Carine, supra note 13, at 187 (asserting question of whether environ-
20011
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preme Court has long held that a threatened injury qualifies as an
injury in fact so long as it is actual or imminent. 190 By holding oth-
erwise and requiring additional scientific evidence, the Gaston Cop-
per majority ignored legitimate health and environmental concerns,
and unnecessarily raised the standards required to establish
standing. 191
The Gaston Copper majority denied that CLEAN presented any
substantial evidence that implied Gaston Copper's discharges im-
pacted any other waterway besides Lake Watson. 192 Tort-like causa-
tion and scientific certainty, however, are not necessary to establish
the injury in fact and fairly traceable requirements of standing. 193
mental group's injuries were fairly traceable to defendants' action is more difficult
requirement to satisfy); Irvin, supra note 66, at 96 (explaining to establish individ-
ual standing plaintiffs must show they personally suffered injury fairly traceable to
defendant's conduct).
190. See Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at 556-57 (commenting size of injury is not impor-
tant and identifiable small injury will suffice); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Work-
ers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (discussing that inquiry is whether
injury presents real, substantial controversy between parties that possess adverse
legal interests and dispute which is definite and concrete rather than hypothetical
or abstract); see also Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d at 122 (noting when plaintiff
asserts that defendant's threatened injury is source of plaintiff's standing, plaintiff
must demonstrate that threatened injury is imminent); Dolgetta, supra note 4, at
716 (explaining that particularized means injury must affect plaintiff in personal
and individual way); Kalen, supra note 43, at 14 (discussing court's finding that
injury in fact requires more than mere injury to cognizable interest). See generally
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990) (providing pollution is considered injury that
interferes with enjoyment of natural resources).
191. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 118 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (providing
that record is full of evidence that Gaston Copper is polluting its receiving waters).
The plaintiffs produced discharge monitoring reports over a four year period
which they claim showed over 500 violations of effluent discharge limits. See id.
(observing that plaintiffs also presented evidence as to adverse health and environ-
mental effects of these discharges); cf. Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 844 (provid-
ing that Congress legislates policies to which courts can cite in finding standing in
cases where standing might not otherwise be established); Dolgetta, supra note 4,
at 715 (remarking that standing has been denied in few environmental cases).
192. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 113-14 (noting that although majority con-
cluded CLEAN only presented evidence of its members' concern regarding water-
ways, it overlooked past evidence of pollution emanating from Gaston Copper's
facility).
193. See Powell Dufflyn, 913 F.2d at 72 (stating fairly traceable requirement
does not mean plaintiffs must demonstrate to scientific certainty that defendant
and defendant alone caused plaintiffs injury); see also Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d
at 124 (remarking that effluent discharges pose real threats to environment, thus
qualifying them as threatened injury for standing purposes); Cedar Point, 73 F.3d at
557 (providing that injury to aesthetic, environmental or recreational interests is
sufficient to establish standing and these injuries need not be substantial); Village
of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that
probability of injury is enough to grant standing to plaintiff); Sierra Club v. Sim-
kins Industries, Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing threat of future
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The dissent properly noted that CLEAN submitted evidence which
clearly demonstrated the presence of past pollution from Gaston
Copper's plant in Wilson Shealy's lake. 194 The dissent further
noted that CLEAN provided evidence at trial of Gaston Copper's
own studies, which indicated elevations in effluent concentrations
in fish tissue from Lake Watson as well as the facility's failure of
forty-one toxicity tests between 1991 and 1995.195 Despite this com-
pelling evidence, the majority held that the evidence CLEAN intro-
duced was not sufficient to constitute standing, and wrongly
dismissed the suit. 19 6 Based on the plaintiffs' presentation of evi-
dence, Chief Justice Wilkinson astutely asserted that "no court has
seen fit to restrict citizens such as Wilson Shealy from vindicating
their legal rights under the Clean Water Act, and many routinely
consider similar claims. In finding that this claim fails to confer
standing, the majority stands alone. 1 9 7
V. IMPACT
The Gaston Copper decision improperly requires plaintiffs to
prove standing requirements to a scientific certainty.1 98 This
injury of effluent permit violation coupled with actual injury stemming from re-
porting and sampling violations to qualify for injury in fact requirement); see gener-
ally Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298 (asserting plaintiff does not have to wait for harm to
occur before seeking judicial relief); Carine, supra note 13, at 185 (stating Su-
preme Court has declared that magnitude of alleged injury is not important for
standing purposes as long as some identifiable injury was present); Millan, supra
note 20, at 419 (remarking that it is not relevant for standing requirement pur-
poses whether injury is past or future impairment).
194. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 119 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting
evidence that DHEC employees analyzed water quality in Shealy's lake and re-
ported presence of copper, zinc, nickel, iron and PCBs, all chemicals Gaston Cop-
per's facility had discharged in past).
195. See id. at 118-19 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that Gaston
Copper's permit violation bears direct relationship to health of downstream waters
and ecosystems). The toxicity tests Gaston Copper failed between March of 1991
and 1995 consisted of placing small organisms in samples of the effluent and
counting the number that became sick as result of the effluent. See id. (noting that
despite these tests and studies, majority found no degradation to ecosystems down-
stream and concluded Gaston Copper was not performing worse than in previous
years).
196. See id. at 119-20 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (stating majority rejects
Shealy's evidence of past pollution strictly on basis that DHEC's tests occurred
prior to Gaston Copper purchase of facility in 1991). According to the dissent, for
the majority to find standing, they would require evidence that it can touch and
feel before it is willing to recognize a threatened injury. See id. (comparing major-
ity's approach in Gaston Copper to Constitution's, which does not require plaintiffs
to wait until injury occurs before plaintiff may seek relief in court).
197. Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 122 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 116-18 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (commenting that as result
of Fourth Circuit's holding in Gaston Copper, courts should now expect "battles of
2001]
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heightened requirement will, in effect, prevent plaintiffs with legiti-
mate claims from obtaining relief, and frustrate the Congressional
intent behind the citizen suit provision of CWA.199 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit in Gaston Copper improperly added a new hurdle to
the requirements of standing.200
The true impact of the Gaston Copper case, however, lies in its
inability to clarify the issue of standing.20 1 The federal circuits' in-
ability to agree upon the standing requirements will lead to incon-
sistent rulings which will inevitably lead to forum shopping.20 2 The
Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a circuit opinion on the
issue of standing under CWA in order to resolve the confusion sur-
rounding the representational standing requirements and to pre-
vent these inconsistencies. 20 3 Although the Supreme Court has
provided the circuits with rudimentary requirements and criteria
for establishing standing, a more decisive decision is needed. 20 4
As a result of this judicial confusion, the various circuit courts'
interpretations of the standing doctrine have, not surprisingly,
the experts" over standing requirements). For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Gaston Copper to raise the standing requirements, see supra notes 101-22
and accompanying text.
199. See id. (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that Gaston Copper's ma-
jority's holding will result in "expensive, lengthy sideshows to the straightforward
issue under the Clean Water Act - namely, whether a defendant is violating its
discharge permit"). For a discussion of Congress' intent behind the citizen suit
provision of CWA, see supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
200. See Gaston Copper, 179 F.3d at 116 (noting Fourth Circuit's "opinion sim-
ply stands for the basic proposition that if a plaintiff organization craves standing,
it must allege sufficient facts . . . demonstrating actual or imminent injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's conduct before standing attaches").
201. See id. (finding that Gaston Copper decision only added to confusion sur-
rounding standing requirements).
202. See Carine, supra note 13, at 205-06 (noting that circuit courts have not
ruled uniformly on standing requirements, but instead have individually at-
tempted to define elements of standing); see also Dolgetta, supra note 4, at 726-27
(finding circuit courts do not always address issues regarding each requirement of
standing, rather they attempt to further define or create new requirements for
standing); Kalen, supra note 43, at 3 (finding Supreme Court decisions regarding
standing are flawed).
203. See Kalen, supra note 43, at 3 (providing that Supreme Court decisions
have led to confusion and disagreement among lower courts on application of
standing requirements); Krauthamer, supra note 19, at 859 (stating that until Con-
gress clarifies its intent behind CWA, courts will "do their part and liberally con-
strue their discretion in defining as legally cognizable injuries those actions that
are harmful yet undetectable").
204. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (stating requirements for individ-
ual standing); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733-38 (1972) (listing
elements needed for representational standing). For a discussion regarding re-
quirements for establishing standing, see supra notes 53-75 and accompanying text.
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been the topic of many symposiums and journal articles. 20 5 These
jurisprudential discussions, however, have yet to clarify the standing
doctrine to the satisfaction of the circuit courts; only a Supreme
Court decision with binding effect on the circuit courts will accom-
plish this end. If the Supreme Court fails to clarify the standing
requirements, the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the doc-
trine will continue, leaving citizens like Wilson Shealy and environ-
mental groups like CLEAN without redress.20 6
Amanda J. Masucci
205. See Millan, supra note 20 (detailing Fifth Circuit Symposium in Fall of
1998 which debated and reviewed various circuit courts interpretations and hold-
ings of standing requirements); see, e.g., Carine, supra note 13, at 179-80 (explain-
ing that standing doctrine has been harshly criticized by legal scholars because of
federal courts' manipulation in determining requirements needed). In fact, an
article published in 1993 by Arthur Carine, a past member of the Villanova Envi-
ronmental LawJournal, discussed the confusion surrounding the requirements of
standing. See id. It has been almost seven years since that article and yet there is
still no further clarification on the topic.
206. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 179
F.3d 107, 122-23 (4th Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (explaining plaintiff
not redressed because Fourth Circuit held he lacked standing).
2001] 209
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